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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK ANTHONY OTT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040638-SC 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
The Court has requested supplemental briefing on whether defendant's Alford plea 
to aggravated murder "is defective as a matter of law." The specific question posed by the 
Court is whether defendant's plea "could satisfy the elements of section 76-5-202," 
particularly the requirement that the defendant "knowingly and intentionally kill the victim." 
Otherwise stated, the question is whether defendant's plea had a sufficient factual basis on 
the intent element for aggravated murder. 
As explained below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's 
guilty plea because there was no timely motion to withdraw it. But even if this Court had 
jurisdiction, defendant'sAlfordplea is not defective, because the record contains a sufficient 
factual basis showing that defendant faced a significant risk of conviction for aggravated 
murder if he had gone to trial. More importantly, the record also shows that defendant 
carefully considered and weighed that risk before entering his plea. His plea, therefore, was 
entered intelligently and voluntarily. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY 
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER 
MOVED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's Alford plea because 
he has not filed a timely motion to withdraw it. The plea withdrawal statute governs the basis 
and timing for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004). 
A guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a). A request to withdraw 
a guilty plea must "be made by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(b). "Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
[the statute] shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c). 
This Court has repeatedly held that this statutory deadline for moving to withdraw a 
guilty plea is jurisdictional; thus, the failure to file a timely motion to withdraw deprives both 
the trial court and the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the validity of the plea. State 
v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ffif 10-14, 167 P.3d 1046; Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11, % 25, 
152 P.3d 306; State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ffi[ 13-20,114 P.3d 585; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 
13, If 3, 40 P.3d 630. See also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43, f 11 n.2, 116 P.3d 374 ("As 
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Merrill makes clear/' untimely motions to withdraw a plea "deprive[] the district court of 
jurisdiction to entertain those motions"); State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,995 (Utah 1993) (per 
curiam) (under former version of plea statute, right to withdraw plea "extinguished" once 
time limit passed). In addition, this Court has applied section § 77-13-6(2)(c) according to 
its terms, holding that a defendant who misses the statutory deadline may challenge the 
validity of a guilty plea only by filing a petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and 
rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, ffl[ 6-7, 148 P.3d 
990. 
Defendant was well aware of this jurisdictional deadline. The trial court told him of 
it at the change of plea hearing: "Any motion to withdraw your plea must be in writing and 
filed prior to imposition of your sentence." R1372:18. Defendant's written plea statement 
confirmed that he understood that he would "not be allowed to withdraw [his] plea after 
sentencing for any reason." Rl 130. Defendant was also informed that by pleading guilty, 
he waived the right to challenge his guilt on appeal and that any appeal would be limited to 
challenging his sentence. R1372:18, 26; Rl 127, 1128. 
Despite being expressly and repeatedly informed of this jurisdictional deadline, 
defendant did not timely move to withdraw his plea. Indeed, he has never claimed to have 
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filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea.1 This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to 
examine the validity of defendant's plea. 
That the Court has sua sponte raised this issue does not change the jurisdictional 
analysis. If defendant had raised this issue in his opening brief, this Court clearly would not 
have jurisdiction to entertain it. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, Iffi 10-14; Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 
ffl[ 13-20. If this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a claim when raised by a defendant, it 
surely lacks jurisdiction to entertain a claim when a defendant has chosen not to raise it. To 
conclude otherwise would lead to "similarly situated" defendants being "treated differently." 
Anderson v. Provo City Corp,, 2005 UT 5,118,108 P.3d 701 (citing Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
("All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation")). 
In sum, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of defendant's guilty plea 
for the first time on appeal. If defendant believes his plea is constitutionally defective and 
wants to be relieved from its consequences, he has the same avenue for relief as every other 
defendant who did not file a timely motion to withdraw—a post-conviction petition. See 
Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, fflf 25-26 (no appellate jurisdiction to consider validity of plea first 
time on appeal, but defendant could seek relief through post-conviction); Nicholls, 2006 UT 
!Over two weeks after sentencing, defendant wrote to the trial court that he had 
been trying, without success, "to communicate with my attorney with the desire to 
withdraw my mistaken plea and to appeal." R1299. The letter was accompanied by a 
hand-written notice of appeal and request for appointment of appellate counsel. Id. 
Nothing in the letter suggested that defendant intended it to be a motion to withdraw his 
plea and the trial court did not treat it as such. Significantly, defendant did not claim in 
his opening or reply briefs that he had an unresolved motion to withdraw his plea. But 
even if the letter could reasonably be construed as a motion to withdraw, it was untimely 
and therefore incapable of conferring jurisdiction on this Court. 
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76, fflf 6-7 (no appellate jurisdiction to consider validity of plea absent timely motion to 
withdraw; Post-Conviction Remedies Act "only[] avenue for relief now available to 
Defendant"). 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION, DEFENDANT'S 
ALFORD PLEA IS SUPPORTED BY A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS 
THAT DEFENDANT FACED A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF 
CONVICTION IF HE HAD GONE TO TRIAL; DEFENDANT 
CAREFULLY WEIGHED THAT RISK BEFORE ENTERING HIS 
PLEA 
This Court lacks jurisdiction, but defendant's Alford plea was not defective in any 
event. First, the record reflects a sufficient factual basis that, on the legal theory adopted by 
the trial court, defendant faced a substantial risk of conviction for aggravated murder if he 
had gone to trial. Second, the record shows that defendant carefully weighed that risk and 
that he, therefore, intelligently and voluntarily entered his Alford plea. 
A. A sufficient factual basis supports the intent element of defendant's Alford plea 
to aggravated murder. 
1. A sufficient factual basis supports an Alford plea if the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction. 
While defendant entered ordinary guilty pleas to attempted aggravated murder, 
aggravated arson, and aggravated assault, he entered an Alford plea to aggravated murder to 
avoid risking a death sentence. An Alford plea is one in which the defendant maintains his 
innocence, but, in order to avoid the risk of a harsher penalty, pleads guilty based on a 
5 
concession that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to prove guilt. See North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
Before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must first find that 'there is a factual 
basis for the plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). See also State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 
440,443 (Utah 1983); Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992). In a regular guilty 
plea, a "factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant." Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(4)(B). But in an Alford plea, a factual 
basis is sufficient if it establishes "that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish 
a substantial risk of conviction." Id. See also Willett, 842 P.2d at 862 (factual basis mAlford 
plea must "establish[] facts that would place the defendant at risk of conviction should the 
matter proceed to trial"). 
Utah courts examine the record as a whole to determine whether a sufficient factual 
basis exists. See Willett, 842 P.2d at 861-63; see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 
1273 (Utah 1988); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671,674 (Utah App. 1993). The "record 
as a whole need not be conclusive or uncontroverted on the question of guilt"; however, 
"'there must be evidence from which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was 
guilty—a factual basis for the plea.'" Stilling, 856 P.2d at 674 (quoting United States v. 
Owen, 858F.2d 1514,1517 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
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2. The record here shows that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction for aggravated murder. 
As the Court noted in its order for supplemental briefing, to convict defendant of 
aggravated murder, the State had to prove that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused 
the death of another—in this case, Lacey Lawrence—and that he did so under one of the 
statutorily-enumerated aggravators—in this case, while committing an aggravated arson. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (West 2004). Because it is undisputed that defendant caused 
the death of Lacey Lawrence while committing aggravated arson, the only question is 
whether there was a factual basis that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused her death. 
The trial court properly found a sufficient factual basis on defendant's mental state when it 
denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution adduced evidence that at about 2:13 a.m. 
on September 1, 2002, defendant purchased Coleman fuel, a BIC lighter, and a knife from 
a grocery store near his wife's home. Rl381:84-89. About 15 minutes later, defendant, 
armed with his purchases, cut the phone lines to his wife's home, broke down the back door, 
and repeatedly stabbed Allen Lawrence, who was in the master bedroom. R1381:109-14, 
149, 161-63, 182, 256. Defendant also stabbed his stepdaughter Sarah when she tried to 
intervene. Rl381:182-83. After leaving a bleeding and seriously-injured Lawrence by the 
front door, defendant, who had lost his fuel in the melee, retrieved gasoline from the garage. 
R138L115, 140, 163, 234-35. Defendant then poured gasoline on a couch and loveseat 
located near the front door, down the hall, and on the master bed. Rl 3 81:115-16,121,221, 
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226. After lighting the couch and loveseat on fire, defendant fled the burning house in his 
wife's car. R1381:117,221, 225,244. 
Allen Lawrence was no longer in the front room when defendant returned with the 
gasoline. He and Sarah had escaped through the front door.2 R1381:l 15,143,183-84. But 
defendant's wife, Donna Ott, her daughter Lucy, Lucy's friend Hillary, and Lawrence's six-
year-old daughter Lacey were still in the home. Rl381:115-17,184. The evidence showed 
that although defendant did not know that Lacey was in the home when he lit the fire, he 
knew that others, including his wife and Lucy, were still in the home. R1381:l 16-17, 146 
(defendant looked at Donna while he lit the loveseat); R1381:143 (Lucy came upstairs and 
screamed, prompting defendant to release her mother before retrieving the gasoline). 
The evidence also showed that defendant knew the layout of the house, that Donna 
lived there with her four children, that defendant's two stepdaughters slept in the basement, 
and that it was not unusual for his stepdaughters to have friends sleep over, particularly on 
a holiday weekend. R1381:15-16, 22, 108, 125-26, 190; R1382:283. Despite this 
knowledge, defendant did not go downstairs to make sure that both his stepdaughters were 
out of the house when he lit the fire. Rl 3 82:283. Defendant did not have to worry about his 
two young children, however, because he knew that they were visiting his parents for the 
weekend. R138L21, 50-51,107. 
2It is not clear from the record whether defendant knew that Lawrence and Sarah 
had left the house. &*>R1381:183-84, 193. 
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In closing argument, the State relied on the doctrine of transferred intent to argue that 
defendant intentionally or knowingly caused Lacey's death. Rl382:292. The prosecutor 
began with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-204: 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the actor caused the 
death of a person other than the intended victim shall not constitute a defense 
for any purpose to criminal homicide. 
The prosecutor argued that defendant intended to kill Allen Lawrence and that during the 
same criminal episode he caused Lacey's death. Rl382:295. The prosecutor argued that 
defendant moved continuously from stabbing Lawrence to setting the house on fire, knowing 
that there were other people in the house, thereby creating a "kill zone." Id. The prosecutor 
argued that transferred intent applies when a defendant, intending to kill someone, creates 
a kill zone that endangers others, thereby causing the death of someone other than the 
intended victim. R1382:299. 
The magistrate agreed that transferred intent was an appropriate legal theory in this 
case. R1382:312-13. In finding probable cause, the magistrate noted that defendant went 
to the home intending to forcibly enter it, kill Lawrence, and bum the premises. R1382:315. 
But the magistrate also pointed out that defendant had "set the fire on purpose, knowing that 
people were in the home, knowing it was a residence," and "in an area which would 
essentially cut off an exit from that home through the traditional doorways once the fire was 
started." Id. 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover for aggravated murder, arguing that the 
preliminary hearing evidence was insufficient to show that he had intentionally or knowingly 
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caused Lacey's death. Rl 62-66,171-75. Defendant essentially argued that the transferred 
intent theory did not apply to his case because his conduct in trying to kill Lawrence was by 
stabbing and his conduct in killing Lacey was by starting the fire. Rl66-68, 174. 
The trial court denied the motion to quash. The trial court agreed with defendant that 
the transferred intent theory did not apply to his conduct in trying to kill Lawrence by 
stabbing. R383. The trial court reasoned that applying a defendant's mental state when he 
engaged in one type of conduct to an outcome resulting from a different type of conduct was 
"simply too tenuous a theory to justify binding a defendant over on a capital offense." Id. 
But the trial court concluded that transferred intent nonetheless applied because, as 
the magistrate found, the preliminary hearing evidence showed that defendant purposely set 
the fire in a place that cut off a likely escape route, knowing that people were in the home. 
Id. The trial court reasoned that a trier of fact could reasonably infer that "a person who 
purposely starts a fire in a home that he knows to be occupied does so with the intent to cause 
the death of the occupants." Id. Thus, a fact finder could reasonably infer that when 
defendant set the fire, he intended to kill Donna, but instead caused the death of Lacey. Id. 
The trial court concluded that whether this was in fact defendant's intent when he set the fire 
was a jury question. Id. 
After unsuccessfully seeking interlocutory review from this Court on that issue, R436, 
921, defendant entered his Alfordplea, Rl 121-29. During the plea hearing, the trial court 
ascertained that defendant understood that the elements of aggravated murder included an 
intentional or knowing mental state and that defendant and his attorneys believed that the 
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State's evidence presented a substantial risk that he would be convicted. R1372:10,13-14; 
see also Rl 123-25. 
Defendant's written plea statement and the prosecutor presented several stipulated 
facts as providing a basis for the trial court to accept the plea and for the State to prove the 
elements of aggravated murder. Rl 123-25. Those facts included the basic facts presented 
at the preliminary hearing, including that in the wee hours of the morning on September 1, 
2002, defendant "purchased a large knife, a package of cigarette lighters, and a one gallon 
container of Coleman fuel"; that defendant immediately took his newly-purchased items to 
his wife's home, knowing that it was "occupied that morning by [his] estranged wife, Donna 
Ott; [his] stepchildren, Sarah and Lucy Gooch; and Allen Lawrence"; that defendant 
repeatedly stabbed Lawrence with the intent to kill him; that defendant stabbed his 
stepdaughter Sarah when she tried to intervene; that "[s]ome time during the course of the 
attack [defendant] left Allen Lawrence seriously injured in the living room area of the 
residence by the front entrance door" to retrieve gasoline from the garage; that defendant 
poured gasoline "around in the house beginning on a love seat by the front door and down 
the hallway into the master bedroom and also on the bed"; that defendant set the fire with the 
lighter he had just purchased; and that "[a]t the time [he] set the fire there were still people 
in the residence." Rl 125. 
Those facts, viewed in light of the entire record, showed that the prosecution had 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction. As the trial court noted in 
denying the motion to quash the bindover, a jury could reasonably find that a person who 
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purposely sets a fire in an occupied home intends to kill the occupants. This finding is 
bolstered when, as here, the arsonist attacks when he knows the occupants are likely to be 
sleeping, cuts the phone lines to prevent the occupants from summoning help, and sets the 
fire so as to cut off a primary escape route. That defendant intended to kill the occupants by 
fire in this case was also supported by the fact that he attacked when he knew that his own 
children were out of harm's way. 
Defendant's claim that he did not know that Lacey was present in the home is not a 
defense to her murder under the foregoing facts and their reasonable inferences. As stated, 
"evidence that the actor caused the death of a person other than the intended victim shall not 
constitute a defense for any purpose to criminal homicide." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-204. 
In sum, the record facts established a factual basis that the State had sufficient 
evidence to present a substantial risk of conviction if defendant had chosen to go to trial. 
B. The record shows that defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered his Alford 
plea. 
This Court should also refrain from disturbing defendant's plea where the record 
shows that defendant entered it intelligently and voluntarily and only after carefully 
weighing the risk of a death sentence if he went to trial. 
As stated, defendant disputed from the beginning that the State could show that he 
intentionally or knowingly killed Lacey. He challenged the State's legal and factual theory 
on the requisite mental state in his closing argument at the preliminary hearing, R1382:307-
09, and in his motion to quash the bindover, R159-75. When the trial court rejected his legal 
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and factual arguments in the motion to quash the bindover, defendant sought interlocutory 
review on the issue from this Court. R436. This Court denied the petition. R921. 
Thus, defendant was well aware of this issue and fully litigated it in the trial court. 
But once this Court denied the petition for interlocutory review, defendant was bound by the 
trial court's legal ruling that the State could rely on a theory of transferred intent to show that 
he intentionally or knowingly caused Lacey's death. Thus, he was faced with two options. 
One, he could risk a conviction and death sentence should the jury believe he intended to kill 
the known occupants of the house when he set the fire. If defendant chose this option and 
was convicted and sentenced to death, he could still try to convince this Court on direct 
appeal either that the doctrine of transferred intent did not apply to him or that the facts 
ultimately presented at trial were insufficient to show that he intended to kill the known 
occupants of the house. But if this Court did not agree with him, defendant would be stuck 
with a death sentence. 
Two, defendant could choose to avoid any risk of the death penalty by doing what he 
did here—entering a plea in exchange for death being taken off the table. This was the only 
option that could guarantee that defendant would not be subjected to a death sentence. 
By entering an unconditional plea to aggravated murder, defendant intentionally 
abandoned his prior legal and factual claim that he did not intentionally or knowingly cause 
Lacey's death. He did so "to avoid the potential of being sentenced to the death penalty." 
Rl 128 (written plea statement). Given the factual record in this case, that decision was a 
reasonable one. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. On the one hand, defendant faced a serious risk 
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of a death sentence. On the other, he could guarantee that his life would be spared. His plea 
also left him with the opportunity to seek further lenity by convincing the jury that he was 
worthy of the opportunity to some day be paroled. Under the circumstances, it is clear that 
defendant's decision to enter his Alfordplea, was made only after carefully considering and 
weighing the risks if he chose to go to trial. His plea was therefore knowing and voluntary. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the validity of defendant's Alfordplea. But 
even if this Court did have jurisdiction, the plea, which defendant entered intelligently and 
voluntarily, had a sufficient factual basis. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this h day of August, 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
tr* AURA B. DUPAIX ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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